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Highlights 
• We explore key elements of good governance in health linkage 
• Adaptive reflexive governance models are essential  
• Two examples illustrate how we can achieve standardisation of practice 
• Distinct elements of governance compiled in a composite fashion tend to challenges 
  
Abstract 
Purpose 
To provide an overview of essential elements of good governance of data linkage for 
health-related research, to consider lessons learned so far and to examine key 
factors currently impeding the delivery of good governance in this area. Given the 
considerable hurdles which must be overcome and the changing landscape of health 
research and data linkage, a principled, proportionate, risk-based approach to 
governance is advocated. 
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Discussion 
In light of the considerable value of data linkage to health and well-being, the United 
Kingdom aspires to design and deliver good governance in health-related research. 
A string of projects have been asking: what does good governance look like in data 
linkage for health research? It is argued here that considerable progress can and 
must be made in order to develop the UK’s contribution to future health and wealth 
economies, particularly in light of mis-start initiatives such as care.data in NHS 
England. Discussion centres around lessons learned from previous successful health 
research initiatives, identifying those governance mechanisms which are essential to 
achieving good governance.  
 
Conclusion  
This article suggests that a crucial element in any step-increase of research 
capability will be the adoption of adaptive governance models. These must recognise 
a range of approaches to delivering safe and effective data linkage, while remaining 
responsive to public and research user expectations and needs as these shift and 
change with time and experience. The targets are multiple and constantly moving. 
There is not - nor should we seek - a single magic bullet in delivering good 
governance in health research. 
  
Keywords 
data linkage; health research; electronic health records; information governance; secondary 
uses 
 
1 Introduction: The Problem and the Vision 
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The recent debacle over care.data reveals yet another aspect of the multifaceted 
entity that is data sharing in healthcare.1 The government and NHS England proposal 
to extract data from patient records for retention and use in a centralised database – 
with possible access from commercial entities – has not only generated considerable 
criticism, but led to suspension of the scheme, in order to allow better consultation 
with and involvement of patients and public.2 The initiative has only very recently 
(partially) re-launched, and it remains to be seen how the four pathfinder projects 
progress and how they are received by the public.3 Some of us have argued 
elsewhere that the initiative was premature and ill-conceived for want of ‘social 
licence’: that it, the false assumption that public confidence in GPs could simply be 
borrowed across to such an initiative.4 This must also be set against the 2013 
Caldicott 2 Review5 into responsible sharing of patient data which, significantly, 
added a seventh principle to the Caldicott Guardians’ guiding principles: ‘[t]he duty to 
share information can be as important as the duty to protect patient confidentiality’.6 
More recently, the Cabinet Office has published a discussion document on data-
sharing policy. It points out that the common assumption that government 
departments can easily share data to improve services is false.7 Against this, in turn, 
we have the on-going uncertainty over the legal position on data processing, driven 
by European Commission plans to introduce a Data Protection Regulation to tighten 
up the legal regimes across the continent,8 while in England the recent passing of the 
Care Act 2014 now gives power to the Health Research Authority (HRA) to authorise 
the processing of confidential medical information for medical research, subject to 
approval by an ethics committee (section 117), and requires the HRA to put  ‘ in 
place and operate a system for reviewing decisions.’9 All of this typifies, and can be 
seen as a reaction to, a pre-existing problem identified by the Academy of Medical 
Sciences in a number of its outputs,10 namely, that a culture of caution prevails in 
data sharing for (health) research.11    
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This is not to suggest that responsible research using health data cannot or does not 
happen. Indeed, the advent of the Farr Institute of Health Informatics Research 
builds on projects already delivered around the UK in each of the four nodes that 
make up the current consortium. Thus for example, SAIL12/CIPHER in Wales 
operates in a privacy-protecting safe haven.13 There is a secure file transfer system 
in place for data being brought into the SAIL databank. Secure, remote data access 
is controlled and possible only when such access has been authorised. All output 
has to be approved. North of the border, the Scottish Health Informatics Programme 
(SHIP) has delivered a good governance framework to maximise the value of 
research using Scotland’s rich health datasets. The framework is founded upon a 
mechanism of risk-based proportionate governance that reduces unnecessary 
regulatory burden without diluting appropriate scrutiny. At the University of 
Manchester and in collaboration with NHS partners, a technical solution to the 
‘consent for consent’ problem was developed, enabling researchers to quickly and 
easily determine the likelihood of recruiting the required number of patients for a 
clinical trial protocol and to enact the recruitment process. 14 
 
University College London (UCL) has developed an Identifiable Data Handling 
Service (IDHS) to allow authorised researchers to analyse clinical research data-sets 
within a data safe haven15, where identifiable or pseudonymised data do not leave 
the secure boundary of the system.  The service has also provided training 
workshops for researchers around information governance, and provides assistance 
for research projects when seeking both Information Toolkit Governance Level 2 
compliance and exemption from the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality under 
Section 251 of the NHS Act. 
 
The vision of the Farr initiative is: 
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‘To harness health data for patient and public benefit by setting the international 
standard for the safe and secure use of electronic patient records and other 
population-based datasets for research purposes.’16 
 
The consortium comprises 24 academic Institutions and two Medical Research 
Council (MRC) units, bolstered by an additional £20 million in capital funds from the 
MRC. It aims to deliver high-quality, cutting-edge research linking electronic health 
data with both other forms of routinely collected data and other areas of research. It 
is also committed towards capacity building in health informatics research. The Farr 
Institute aims to provide the electronic infrastructure to facilitate collaboration across 
the four nodes, support their safe use of patient and research data for health and 
social care research. It will further enable partnerships through the provision of a 
physical structure which co-locates NHS organisations, industry, and other UK 
academic centres. 
 
The common foundational principle that underpins all of the work of the Farr Institute 
is a commitment to responsible data sharing for the promotion of health and well-
being. This commitment, in turn, is founded on a belief that scientifically sound, 
ethically robust data sharing for health research is in the public interest. This does 
not ignore the considerable importance of appropriate privacy and security 
measures, because – equally – robust protection of privacy is also in the public 
interest. However, nowhere is protection of privacy an absolute. This is true as much 
in law as in ethics. Indeed, the notion of absolute security of data is probably an 
unattainable goal, and certainly a foolish policy promise. No custodian of data should 
lead data subjects to believe otherwise. Responsible data management is about 
professional and responsible management of risk, and risk comes in many forms. It 
includes, but is not restricted to:  
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• invasion of privacy,  
• potential discrimination or stigmatisation and resultant distress,  
• economic threats and  
• loss of trust.  
 
In addition, any data custodian must consider risks to their reputational integrity if 
unjustifiable or irresponsible data linkages or disclosures are made. This is true even 
if such linkages or disclosures are entirely lawful. Good governance is not merely a 
matter of compliance with the law.  
 
And yet the law poses considerable challenges for the data linkage aspirations of 
entities like the Farr Institute. Until now, the node activities have occurred in three 
distinct countries of the United Kingdom, subject to two different legal systems and 
over-shadowed by a European regime. The vision to lead international standards 
complicates matters further, especially any prospect of international data travel. Any 
attempt to harmonise national – let alone international – arrangements would be 
futile. There can be no one-size-fits-all approach to such rich and complex regulatory 
settings. Rather, the governance approach of the Farr Institute is considerably more 
realistic – to bring about mutual recognition of standards and best practices, drawing 
on lessons to date from regional successes, and considering where common ground 
and approaches might be extrapolated to other environments. Approximation is  key. 
 
As a crucial first step in this process of approximation of standards, the Farr 
governance team has identified critical areas of attention which serve as the 
foundational elements of good governance frameworks, and thus the starting points 
for further deliberation and construction of initiatives on a larger and more publicly-
valuable scale. It is important to stress that the ethos is one of co-production of good 
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governance between data custodians, potential data users, and data subjects 
themselves through robust and iterative engagement. It also requires transparent 
development and equitable access policies. The immediate lessons from care.data 
include the serious inadequacy of assuming that it is sufficient to attempt to inform 
data subjects unidirectionally through leafleting alone. Effective communication with 
stakeholders, especially with those for whom privacy is in play, must go beyond the 
mere provision of information. Equally, it is not enough simply to pass law. Care.data 
had a legal basis under the Health and Social Care Act 2012,17 but this still did not 
prevent the adverse reaction to what was proposed. Although the government has 
attempted to provide yet further legal clarity in the Care Act 2014 for the processing 
of confidential medical information under the auspices of the Health Research 
Authority,18 the law can do no more than lay out broad legal parameters for 
operation. The real challenges will be in the Act’s implementation through 
transparent responsible practices. This is where the approach of the Farr Institute 
can offer important insights.    
     
2 The Approach 
The Farr initiative has drawn on its cumulative research expertise thus far to reveal 
the following features that, we suggest, must necessarily form part of any good 
governance framework: 
 
2.1 Consent: the stalwart panacea?  
One of the enduring features of discussions about what constitutes good governance 
in data linkage for research is the question of the role of individual consent. In other 
contexts, such as those involving research with patients’ bodies or their tissues, the 
need for consent is rarely questioned. As a mechanism to give expression to 
individual wishes and to give effect to individual self-rule (autonomy), consent is seen 
as a self-evident truth and non-negotiable regulatory measure of respect.19 There 
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has, accordingly, been considerable borrowing of value from these other contexts to 
make similar claims about the crucial need for consent in information governance. 
But the settings are not the same.  
When stripped of identifiers and other personalised characteristics, and processed at 
an aggregate level, it is not clear that it remains meaningful for any of us to talk of 
‘my data’. Also, consent can give an illusion of control and security, when in fact, the 
only real power that it confers is an ability to say No. And, even if an individual says 
No, other factors might be in play that justify processing of data, such as significant 
public interests or even the vital interests of the individual him- or herself. For this 
and other reasons, consent is neither necessary nor sufficient for legitimate and 
lawful data protection. It is true that, if given, consent can provide a lawful basis for 
processing data,20 But, it is not strictly needed. Finally, consent suffers from a 
practical limitation in that it is almost always an up-front, one-off event.21 While a 
‘right to withdraw’ can, of course, exist through the life-course of a project, this casts 
consent (or, rather, refusal) as an extreme response. As such, consent is ill-equipped 
to ensure that appropriate two-way communication and robust oversight of research 
projects delivers on all interests that are in play.  
 
While acknowledging the considerable value that is imbued in consent, the Farr 
Institute asks whether it is appropriate to cast consent as the driving governance 
mechanism. This is not to reject a role for consent altogether, but rather to see 
consent as one part of a cascade of governance mechanisms that can be deployed 
after a robust assessment of what is at stake in any proposed linkage scenario. This 
has not been the general approach to date.  
 
2.2 Anonymisation: The Tower of Babel? 
The mantra of ‘consent or anonymise’ was the rule of thumb that the former Patient 
Information Advisory Group (PIAG) used during 2002-2004 to explain the legislation, 
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guidelines and medical professionals’ duties of confidence to the research world 
regarding the use of identifiable information outside of the care setting.22 As 
information has become more widely used for research purposes, the appreciation of 
what consent and anonymise mean has evolved, but the rule of thumb has endured. 
Both are separate and distinct: the latter is a means of stripping out identifying 
attributes from datasets so that they can be used legally for purposes beyond which 
they were originally collected; the former is an affirmative action that individuals can 
use to express their autonomy. It is the most obvious basis of expressing trust when 
individuals share sensitive information about themselves. Anonymisation, on the 
other hand, is used to mitigate risks of identifying individuals, protect their rights to 
privacy and to deliver the medical profession’s duty of confidentiality. It does not 
necessarily require consent to perform these roles. However in the process, 
anonymisation also often renders datasets less useful, because moderately 
identifying data are key to answering certain research questions: their removal makes 
linking separate datasets harder, and potentially, research findings less robust, and 
potentially useless. This has resulted in both legislators and data custodians trying to 
establish a balanced approach, whereby bona fide research uses are not 
unnecessarily hindered, do not break the law, nor do they deny a role for consent 
where this is thought to be necessary.23 What is less widely acknowledged is the 
nature of anonymisation techniques: none of these can guarantee anonymity and 
current accepted practice takes a pragmatic view over whether the risk of re-
identification is so low that it can be discounted. For example, the Information 
Commissioner’s Office issued guidance in 2012 that takes such a pragmatic 
approach. It recommends deploying a ‘motivated intruder’ test to assess whether 
anonymisation techniques are sufficiently robust to allow release or use of data. This 
asks whether ‘ a person who starts without any prior knowledge but who wishes to 
identify the individual from whose personal data the anonymised data has been 
derived’ is reasonably likely to achieve re-identification?24 Another pertinent rule of 
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thumb is that there is always a risk of error and/or accidental disclosure, and the 
counteractive techniques will only be as good as the people who develop and apply 
them. Periodic review of techniques and procedures is crucial to good governance. 
We cannot assume that data adequately anonymised today will always remain so. 
By the same token, the goals of initiatives like the Farr Institute depend on being able 
to reliably link (when appropriate permissions are granted) records between research 
data-sets – a practice rendered extremely challenging after anonymisation 
techniques are applied. This prompted the practice of replacing identifiable attributes 
with a pseudonym, referred to as pseudonymisation. This process provides a means 
of not only matching more reliably between datasets, but also a link back to the 
identifiable record for those who are authorised to do so.  Obviously this raises the 
likelihood of unauthorised participant re-identification during the practice of research, 
placing a greater duty of care on data controllers, a need for more robust risk 
mitigation strategies and rendering anonymisation redundant in some cases. 
 
2.3 Consent or anonymise: challenging the existing paradigm  
Despite its immediate and superficial appeal, the limitations of the ‘consent or 
anonymise’ paradigm have been well recognised in research governance circles. 
The establishment of the PIAG in 2001 is precisely an example of how such 
limitations have been addressed. The group acted in an advisory capacity to the 
Secretary of State to authorise uses of patient-identifiable data for research when 
consent was neither present nor practicable.25 It has since morphed into the 
Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG) acting under the HRA,26 and it is the HRA that 
now has the legal power to authorise data linkages for research under the new Care 
Act 2014. This, however, must be subject to research committee approval. Thus the 
role of CAG – or a similar entity – is set to become a permanent centre stage feature 
in the research governance arena. As a governance approach, it is an example of 
‘authorisation’ of research practices. Namely permissions on linkage occur only after 
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careful and close deliberation of the merits and risks of any proposed research using 
data. The PIAG and CAG have gone to great lengths to be transparent about their 
processes.27 A similar approach was adopted in Scotland through the Privacy 
Advisory Committee (PAC), established in 1991, to advise two of the largest 
custodians of heath data in the country: National Services Scotland of NHS Scotland 
and the National Registers of Scotland.28 It operated on similar levels of transparency 
and accountability. The PAC approvals process has recently been superseded by the 
newly formed Public Benefit and Privacy Panel for Health and Social Care (PBPP).29 
The PBPP provides a streamlined approvals process for applications wishing to 
access NHS Scotland-originating data. Again, the PBPP is dedicated to facilitating 
robust and transparent scrutiny of data access, and the Panel bolsters direct 
involvement of members of the public in both scrutinizing and deciding upon data 
access applications.  However, a notable difference north and south of the border is 
the role of legislation. Scotland has not seen the need to legislate, relying instead on 
the public interest in promoting scientifically sound, ethically robust research. These 
are the guiding parameters for the work of the PBPP. In England and Wales, the 
legislative route has been preferred, and we see the same guiding principles now 
enshrined in the Care Act 2014 which requires the HRA to: 
‘ have regard to the need— 
 
(a) to protect participants and potential participants in health or social care research 
and the general public by encouraging research that is safe and ethical, and 
(b) to promote the interests of those participants and potential participants and the 
general public by facilitating the conduct of such research.’ (section 111(2)) 
 
Furthermore, section 111(3) of the 2014 Act states that:  
‘The HRA must promote the co-ordination and standardisation of practice in the 
United Kingdom relating to the regulation of health and social care research; and it 
 12
must, in doing so, seek to ensure that such regulation is proportionate.’ 30 (emphasis 
added).      
 
No further specifics on how to discharge these duties are provided. We suggest that 
it is here that the work of the Farr Institute can prove to be invaluable. We offer two 
examples from our work to date: (i) the development and operation of the safe haven 
in Wales, and (ii) the design and delivery of proportionate governance in Scotland.  
 
2.4 The safe haven: a new panacea?  
A safe haven can be defined as a specialist, well governed, independently 
scrutinised31 and accredited environment. There are different models within the 
concept of the safe haven,  with some also serving long-term repositories for a 
collection of datasets as well as hosting an environment where data can be accessed 
for research. This section uses the Secure Anonymised Information Linkage (SAIL) 
system as a case study to outline briefly the role of the safe haven, including some of 
its main strengths and weaknesses. The SAIL system is an example of a safe haven 
that is also a repository, and it contains a range of anonymised routine datasets 
about the population of Wales. 
  
Subject to regulatory and governance approvals, anonymously linked data required 
to answer research questions are made accessible within the safe haven, which is 
referred to as the SAIL Gateway. The Gateway acts as an analysis platform with a 
range of software packages, so that data can be analysed therein without being 
released from the system. One of the main strengths of a system such as SAIL is in 
having the data in one databank, thus saving time in data acquisition and facilitating 
research readiness. However, this may also be perceived by some as a weakness, 
and a risk as a possible Big Brother.32 Thus it is imperative that (i) such systems 
have robust data security and governance frameworks, (ii) are subject to 
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independent scrutiny and (iii) proposals to use the data are assessed to ensure they 
have the potential for public/patient benefit whilst safeguarding privacy. Even so, 
there are many multi-faceted challenges in striking the balance between data 
security and usefulness for research, requiring considerable investment in 
infrastructure and expertise. Although they appear to be emerging as the ‘new 
panacea’, safe havens may not provide the solution in all cases. Some organisations 
may not wish to or may not be allowed to by law to export their data. Furthermore, 
public(s) assurance and confidence are paramount to ensuring acceptability. 
 
2.5 Principled, proportionate, and risk-based governance  
 
The Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP) ran from 2009-2013 and was 
funded by the Wellcome Trust to facilitate so-called secondary uses of heath data for 
research, building on the long-established, high-quality datasets held within 
Scotland.33 Working closely with NHS Scotland as the principal data custodians of 
much of Scotland’s health data, the SHIP interdisciplinary consortium identified a set 
of key barriers to more effective and efficient sharing. These were: (i) lack of clarity of 
what was permitted by law, (ii) confusion about when actors had the legal 
responsibility of acting as ‘data custodian’, (iii) lack of streamlined processes for data 
linkage approvals (and agreed parameters for doing so), and (iv) unmet need in 
information governance training.34 The result was the development and delivery of a 
Good Governance Framework (GGF) for SHIP, consisting of four elements:  
 
1. An account of responsibilities of key actors and decision-makers (largely a 
matter of clarifying who is a data controller) 
2. A capacity building facility for researcher training and accreditation and wider 
awareness-raising (delivered through distance learning) 
3. A statement of Principles and Best Practices to guide decision-making 
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4. A mechanism of principled proportionate governance in making data linkage 
assessments. 
 
Importantly, the GGF embraces a principles-based approach, that is, it recognises 
that sensitive decisions must be made that require careful exercises of judgment.35 
Accordingly, it does not seek to be overly prescriptive through a set of hard and fast 
rules, but rather, provides decision-makers with key principles to consider when 
scrutinising data linkage requests. Key principles include the need to demonstrate 
public interest in the proposed data linkage, and to require applicants to recognise 
and minimise privacy risks. A crucial additional pragmatic component of the GGF is 
its mechanisms of considering what proportionate governance looks like. It asks 
three fundamental questions: Is the linkage request dealing with,  
 
(i) safe people, e.g. those accredited by SHIP?,  
(ii) safe data, e.g. those linked through SHIP, and  
(iii) safe environments, e.g. a SHIP safe haven or equivalent, such as 
SAIL.36  
 
If the answer to all of these questions is Yes, then a fast-track route that requires no 
further scruinty of the application is available for researchers. If the answer to any of 
these questions is No, then other more scrutiny-intensive routes must be taken, 
including full review by the PBPP. This, then, is an example of proportionality in 
action, and one from which the HRA might learn some useful lessons.  
 
3. What has Public Engagement told us? 
The lessons from the public and professional responses to the initial roll-out of 
care.data are sobering. Any public interest or good public-based initiative must first 
have a clear basis for making a claim that its foundations are well-established. As 
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indicated above, care.data did have a legal basis in the Health and Social Care Act 
2012, but this was not enough on its own to prevent a backlash. Law alone is 
insufficient to command public and stakeholder support. Moreover, law works far 
better when it puts in place barriers or protections against action; it is less adept at 
promoting particular ends that require sensitive and sensible human exercises of 
judgment. Additionally, any (legal) framework for decision-making on data linkage 
must demonstrate its ability to remain fit for purpose over time, and to continue to 
reflect public groups’ and other stakeholders’ expectations, which can and do 
change. Thus for care.data, it was not enough to say that similar types of use and 
linkage were already practised, albeit on a far less ambitious scale. Finally and 
crucially, the prospect of profit clearly impacts on what different sectors of society will 
tolerate, both within a public health service and  with respect to private and 
confidential data.37 
 
Here again lessons can be learned from the work of the Farr Institute. Many of our 
regional efforts to date have involved public and stakeholder engagement, and our 
approaches to governance have taken the results into account. For example, in SHIP 
our focus group work showed a strong and repeated preference for a role for consent 
in data linkage decisions, albeit that, when explored further, most participants 
recognised and accepted practical limitations of consent for some kinds of research 
(as outlined above).38 Notwithstanding and as a direct response, the SHIP Good 
Governance Framework now provides that any application to use data through SHIP 
must address directly the question of whether a consent-based approach could be 
used. While it is possible to argue that anonymisation or authorisation are more 
appropriate routes for any given application, all applicants must reflect on the 
consent route and provide robust reasons as to why it should not be followed. On 
commercial involvement, our team’s earlier public engagement work on the 
Generation Scotland project – to build a data and tissue resource to explore the role 
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of genes and environment in the onset of disease – showed that there are multiple 
‘publics’ with differing views.39 Specific patient groups, for example, can tend to be 
more tolerant of commerce than health groups.40 Most interestingly and discerningly, 
however, our research found that it is not so much the prospect of profit that publics 
find unacceptable, but the idea of ‘obscene’ profit. Moreover, there is some evidence 
– to be tested further – that commitments to benefit sharing can address some of 
these concerns.41    
 
The work of Farr CIPHER in Wales is built upon the governance principles developed 
in the SAIL system,42 and there is an active Consumer Panel for Data Linkage 
Research43,44 that, in dialogue with various SAIL panels, boards etc.; provides a 
public viewpoint on the re-use of data in research. The Panel expressed a strong 
desire to be better informed about the data linkage studies taking place, recognising 
that often academic proposals and outputs are written for experts in the field. As a 
result, the Information Governance Approval Form now includes not only a section 
for a lay summary, but also a section on the public engagement strategy. Further, 
and as anchored in the Consumer Panel’s Strategic Plan, strategies and measures 
are now in place to facilitate and audit its increasing input into data linkage studies. 
 
Such transparency is reflected in the practices of CAG and the PBPP with respect to 
their approvals. Additonally, the Care Act 2014 now provides that the HRA must 
publish guidance on ‘  (a) principles of good practice in the management and 
conduct of health and social care research; [and] (b) requirements, whether imposed 
by enactments or otherwise, to which persons conducting health or social care 
research are subject.’ 
 
Most recently, the Farr Institute held a workshop with data custodians and 
researchers in order to identify key barriers against and facilitators of data reuse for 
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health research purposes.45 The lack of transparency around care.data and the 
resultant damage this may have caused in terms of eroding trust around data reuse 
emerged as a key concern amongst participants. Civic engagement as a means of 
engendering transparency as well as raising awareness around the public benefits of 
data reuse in research were key priorities for stakeholders. A recent UK data sharing 
review echoes these sentiments. The report stresses that building trust  ‘is the 
responsibility of every digital stakeholder in the UK. It is a joint effort, which needs to 
be a focus for the Government, business, academia and the public’.46 
 
Additional key findings suggest that risk aversion is a significant hindrance to data 
sharing and it was suggested that this was caused by misunderstandings around 
which data reuses are legally permitted and prohibited (and under which conditions). 
In particular, different interpretations arose between data custodians and researchers 
around consent requirements. These key concerns will inform the future work of the 
Farr Institute and will shape governance approaches developed throughout the 
course of the initiative. 
 
4. Constantly Moving Targets: Cross-sectoral and International Linkages 
All of the above advances have been achieved in the health sector and within 
individual countries of the United Kingdom. The Farr Institute is designed to build on 
these developments at the UK level, but the real step-changes that will signal 
success will be demonstrated by delivering on these standards beyond the Farr 
community in the UK. Two key targets are cross-sectoral linkages, and safe and 
effective linkages beyond Farr 
 
At present, a parallel initiative funded by the ESRC is its Administrative Data Linkage 
Centres (ADRC) Network47, with an associated linkage service. The service is 
designed to facilitate research based on linked, routinely-collected administrative 
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data – for example education, crime, housing and employment – whilst also including 
health data. There are particular challenges in accessing and sharing some 
administrative datasets. For example, HM Revenue and Customs is currently 
prevented by law from releasing certain datasets to third parties such as data linkage 
centres or researchers.48 Innovative methods will be needed to enable safe and 
meaningful data re-use. To this end, the Administrative Data Taskforce reported in 
December 2012,49 and the government responded in June 2013.50 The Taskforce’s 
principal recommendation was the establishment of ADRCs in each of the four 
countries in the UK, as is now the case. Further and in its endorsement of this, the 
government pointed to the good practices emerging from SHIP and SAIL, and 
indicated that these had been strengthened ‘ from April 2013 when the Health and 
Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) gained increased powers to provide data 
linkage services that can be used by others.’51 This, of course, is the body which has 
been wrangling with the fall-out out from care.data. Notwithstanding and as pointed 
out above, the salutary lesson is that mere legislative provision to facilitate data 
linkage and sharing is not enough. Indeed, this raises further questions about 
another of the core recommendations of the Taskforce: the need for legislation. On 
this point the government was more circumspect, calling first for a mapping exercise 
to identify precisely (i) the current barriers and (ii) where existing powers might be 
sufficient but under-used. This reflects the work of the Farr Institute thus far, in that 
our research revealed not so much a problem with law per se, but a prevailing 
attitude in some quarters that militated against data use. Such a cultural reluctance 
cannot merely be legislated away. The proof of the benefits of sharing and linking 
must be clearly, amply and repeatedly demonstrated to increase the public mandate. 
Indeed, this goal was identified as a key priority by Farr workshop participants. 
 
A final and crucial recommendation from the Taskforce was also recognised by the 
government: the need for a strategy for engaging the public. However, we would 
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caution against the tone of the government’s response in terms of what can be 
reasonably expected from any such strategy or plan of engagement. To cite the 
governmental reply: 
 
‘The public must be confident that access will only be made available for legitimate 
research purposes to approved researchers and that the outputs from analysis will in 
no way compromise their privacy.’52 
 
This sets the bar very high in terms of privacy protection. If it is to suggest that a ‘no 
risk’ approach to privacy is the only appropriate standard, it is likely to set up the 
entire enterprise for failure. This is not to suggest that the highest standards should 
not be sought, but rather to say that realistic expectations must be laid down. All data 
use and linkage comes with some degree of risk. This is simply a reality. Governance 
mechanisms such as safe havens, accreditation, risk-based proportionate 
governance and improved researcher training all do considerable work to minimise 
those risks, as well as to maximise likely benefits. But it is foolhardy to suggest that a 
zero tolerance approach to privacy is possible. It is likely only to result in 
disappointment and the undermining of trust. 
 
5. Realising the Vision 
The vision of the Farr Institute is to harness health data for patient and public benefit 
by setting the international standard in trustworthy reuse of electronic patient records 
and related linkable data for large-scale research. 
When dealing with multiple sectors, diverse stakeholders, divergent legal systems 
and myriad datasets, it is clear that no single model of governance will be suitable in 
all situations. The strength of the Farr Institute is that it demonstrates the value of 
distinct elements of governance that can be compiled in a composite fashion to 
deliver the most robust framework in any given context, while remaining flexible and 
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adaptable over time. The emerging top-level message is that no single paradigm nor 
governance tool is necessarily a preferred option. ‘Consent or anonymise’ has been 
shown to be inadequate on its own, and has necessitated a third option of 
‘authorisation’. Safe havens are important technical means to deliver high levels of 
security, but they do not provide answers on the logically-prior ethical judgments 
about whether data access should be granted or certain data linked.  
 
Other quasi-technical solutions are being developed elsewhere that attempt to 
empower citizens throughout the research process, such as the notion of dynamic 
consent whereby preferences (or opt-outs) can be exercised as a research project 
evolves.53 The important point to note about these efforts is the value-base that they 
reflect. This is the notion of the primacy of the individual over other considerations 
such as the public benefit of robust research. Added to this, there might be 
unintended privacy consequences of such approaches, because they will necessarily 
require a technical ability to always link downstream data uses to an identifiable 
individual, in order for future preferences to be traced and given effect. Thus while 
dynamic consent offers the prospect of continuing control that can be delivered by 
technical means, an on-going commitment to consent as a driver of health research 
governance privileges particular values and interests over others, here notably 
individualistic concerns over wider public interests.  
 
The Farr Institute does not envisage any one governance tool as necessarily optimal. 
Rather, we would emphasise the importance of the triangulation of good governance, 
whereby consent, anonymisation, and authorisation can work together and be 
deployed in different measures depending on the particular circumstances of any 
proposed linkage. It should not be forgotten, as so often happens, that even an 
authorisation body can require specific, informed consent to be obtained if it believes 
that this is the best means to deliver the overall set of interests at stake.   
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Transparency in all of these efforts must be re-emphasised, with respect to decisions 
about linkages and with respect to access policies and practices equally. This can be 
achieved in large part through publication on websites and social media, but the 
passive provision of one-way information is only part of the picture. As care.data has 
shown, the reality is that many citizens will remain in the dark about many data 
linkage initiatives. Thus a robust and sustained strategy of genuine public 
engagement is required, such as that recommended by the ESRC’s Administrative 
Data Taskforce.  
As for the research community itself, there must be a clear and open invitation to 
access data safely, with appropriate safeguards. Further, it will be crucial for all 
parties to understand that, in advocating ‘open access’, there is no endorsement 
whatsoever of data as a free-for-all. In other words, not everyone should have 
access to all data available, regardless of their motivation or ability to meet the 
necessary ethical and legal standards. Rather, the Farr governance team endorses 
the approach of the Royal Society in its 2012 report – Science as an Open 
Enterprise54 – which helpfully proposes a model of ‘Intelligent Openness’. This 
mandates robust curation of valuable data, openness to sharing and clear 
commitment to appropriate protection of privacy. Among other things, it promotes 
principles not only of accessibility, but also of verifiability and of intelligibility. This last 
criterion must be true as much for citizens as for researchers who would access 
data.  
 
There are many examples that suggest that the legislative route is of limited value, 
especially with respect to promoting trust in data linkages. Law must, of course, set 
non-negotiable parameters of what is clearly unacceptable. Beyond this, however, 
good governance must support and assist data linkage decision-makers to weigh up 
a range of considerations and exercise good judgment. Good governance rests 
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unavoidably upon discretion; considerations change over time and are another 
example of the moving targets in this article. Good governance shifts with these 
changes, and delivers understanding and reassurance of roles, responsibilities and 
abilities with respect to responsible data sharing and linkage. 
 
Finally, more needs to be done to deliver genuine engagement with stakeholders and 
public groups. We still have a lot to learn about what that means. It should include, 
for example, the possibility of influencing matters, including the direction of research 
where appropriate. Two-way communication is key, as reflected from the recent Farr 
workshop where participants stressed the need for meaningful civic engagement. 
This is not just about delivering one-way information about what is going on. 
Moreover, it must reflect a humility that we do not know all the answers before we 
begin. This emphasises, once again, the crucial importance of adaptive and 
receptive governance mechanisms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The Farr Institute is aligning practices across institutions and the countries of the UK 
with seamless data sharing for multiple purposes. The common ethos is an 
openness to mutual learning and cooperation. In delivering on this, we suggest that 
the following key lessons must be taken on board:  
 
1. There is no magic bullet in delivering good governance: a variety of 
approaches is required; identifying and adopting these approaches is crucial for the 
UK; 
 
2. Guiding principles of responsible data linkage are a defensible, flexible and 
adaptable approach that can be of value across sectors and countries. Central 
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among these are the importance of proportionality and mutual recognition of what 
counts as good practice; 
 
3. Stakeholder and public engagement is key both to inform and to shape 
governance over time – models must be receptive and adaptive; the worth and the 
sustainability of any approach will stand or fall by its ability to demonstrate these 
features.  
 
Whilst the UK still has considerable progress to make, it is taking considerable steps 
towards delivering upon its goals for data linkage.  
Summary Table 
The authors shall provide a table with in 2-4 bullets statements on 'what was already 
known on the topic' and also in 2-4 bullets statements on 'what this study added to 
our knowledge'. Note that the second part of the table should not list the results of 
the study as such. It should address what this study has proven and what insights 
have been gained. 
 
What is already known on the topic What this study has added to our 
knowledge 
 
Data linkage for health-related research 
is a growing and complicated regulatory 
area 
 
Key elements of good governance  
 
Currently, many valuable uses of health 
data for health research are being 
impeded 
 
Adaptive and reflexive governance 
models are essential in order to achieve 
good governance and to address future 
challenges 
 
A standardisation of practice is sought 
around how data uses are governed, 
whilst at the same time ensuring 
proportionate regulation 
 
Two concrete examples are offered 
illustrating how we can achieve 
standardisation of practice which 
facilitates proportionate governance 
 
Consent, anonymisation and most 
recently, safe havens have been 
 
Distinct elements of governance which 
are compiled in a composite fashion can 
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considered as solutions to the myriad 
governance challenges which regulation 
of health data face 
tend to current and future challenges 
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